**Text:** **The United States federal government should remove food, potable water, and dual-use medical sanctions against Cuba.**

#### The embargo is a relic of Cold War policy that serves to oppress citizens and uses the Cuban people as a means to an end.

Lesser, Financial Director at the George Washington Pre-Law Student Association, 10

(Max, November 9th 2010, Penn Political Review, “The End of the Embargo Era,” <http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2010/11/the-end-of-the-embargo-era/>, accessed 7/12/13, AS)

It has now been five long decades since the American embargo on Cuba was first implemented. In the early 1960s, with the Cold War raging, the United States imposed severe eco­nomic sanctions on the Caribbean na­tion in the hopes that it would curtail communist revolutionary Fidel Cas­tro’s reign. The goal of this measure was clear: to starve Cuba into a new revolution that would restore a pro-American government. In the midst of the Cold War, this embargo seemed justifiable as a temporary method to prevent the establishment of a com­munist stronghold so close to the con­tiguous United States. But today, in a changed global landscape, a complete economic embargo on Cuba no longer serves the purpose it once did. The Soviet Union is no more. The Cold War threat of communism is no more. The reign of Fidel Castro as President of Cuba is no more. Yet the plight of the Cuban people continues. A recent report by the Cuban govern­ment suggests that the American em­bargo has cost Cuba $751 billion since it went into effect. While some of that money possibly would have gone to­ward Cold War anti-American efforts, most of it would have instead found its way to the Cuban populace, especial­ly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rather, the embargo has re­sulted in greatly inadequate supplies of medicine, food, and potable water for a large portion of the island’s popula­tion. As a consequence of this failure, it is time to reassess an act that, rather than liberating Cuban citizens from the perils of communism, has only doomed them to impoverishment. Cuba, to its credit, has begun to reassess its own economic strategies. Currently, about 85 percent of the Cu­ban workforce – approximately 5 mil­lion people – is part of the public sec­tor. That number is down from over 90 percent before the end of the Cold War, and is certain to fall to a far lower level in the coming months. Due to the effects of the global economic crisis, Cuba, under current President Raúl Castro, has announced its intention to terminate almost 500,000 public sector workers by March 2011, a stag­gering 10 percent of its workforce. To compensate, 250,000 self-employment licenses will be granted so that many of those who find themselves out of a job will be able to begin working in the private sector. The issuance of these licenses coincides with an expansion of the number of job fields that can be privatized, meaning more Cubans will now be able to maintain their own businesses. While certainly not a capi­talist revolution, these reforms exem­plify an effort on the part of the Cuban government to adapt economically in a changed landscape; a similar will­ingness by the United States to adapt its policies would serve to ameliorate some of Cuba’s financial woes. Despite the importance of the in­creased welfare of the Cuban people, however, it is not the only benefit that would result from a change in the American government’s attitude toward Cuba. Last April, President Barack Obama, addressing the Sum­mit of the Americas, stated that it was time for “a new beginning with Cuba.” With promises of improving America’s image abroad in mind, a change in the US government’s embargo policy would go a long way toward achieving that goal. In fact, global sentiments against the United States embargo on Cuba have risen steadily in the past two decades. A vote in the United Na­tions General Assembly last year con­demned the embargo for the 18th time in a row. Furthermore, the vote was nearly unanimous at an astounding 187 to 3, with only the United States, Israel, and Palau voting in favor of the embargo. This overwhelming dis­approval should come as no surprise. Most other nations have long main­tained an economic presence in Cuba, and even American allies like Canada have been vocal against US legislation that imposes fines on foreign corpora­tions that do business within Cuba. If President Obama is serious about his intentions to repair perceptions of the United States across the globe, he must listen to his own words and reexamine a policy that the vast majority of na­tions in the world have condemned. The stumbling block for change lies in a lack of understanding of the goals of the embargo. In essence, the plight of the Cuban people that resulted from the embargo was a crucial component to its intended goal. While an unfortu­nate means to an end, the idea was to create popular discontent within Cuba so that citizens would enact change for themselves. The regrettable economic hardship in Cuba was thus seen as a sign that the embargo was working. Yet those who continue to champion Cuban travails as an American victory seem to ignore the simple reality that even with decades of troubles, no up­rising has taken place. Clearly, the for­mula must be recalculated.

#### Specifically, sanctions require the US to oppose any loans to Cuba, financial restrictions prevent normal banking transactions, and dual-use restrictions prevent importation of critical medical supplies.

Bolender, 13

[Keith, 4-22-13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The Terrorist List, and Terrorism as Practiced Against Cuba,” http://www.coha.org/22355/, accessed 6-25-13, YGS]

Of all the components to the United States hostile strategy against Cuba, nothing raises the ire of the Castro government more than its inclusion on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. The designation is seen by Havana as an impediment towards improving relations and as a cruel hypocrisy that provides political cover for Washington to justify the imposition of economic penalties along with the perpetuation of anti-revolutionary propaganda.¶ There is an opportunity to eliminate that stumbling block in the next few weeks, if newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry decides to recommend Cuba’s deletion from the list to President Obama. Kerry has until the release of the State Department’s annual terror report on April 30 to make the determination of whether Cuba will remain on the terrorist list. High ranking Cuban officials are closely watching this development, indicating the removal could offer an opportunity to re-engage with the United States. [1]¶ The history of Cuba’s controversial inclusion goes back to 1982, the same year Iraq was taken off the list by the Reagan administration. Besides Cuba, only Sudan, Iran, and Syria continue to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea was dropped in 2008, while Pakistan, long the home of Osama Bin Laden and recognized as a haven for Islamic terrorists, has never been considered. Saudi Arabia, where the majority of the 9/11 terrorists came from, is looked upon as a staunch ally of the United States.¶ There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.

#### This direct violence against the Cuban people is a form of economic terrorism, but is concealed by an ethically bankrupt form of consequentialism that excuses this violence in the name of national security.

Kauzlarich, professor of sociology @ Southern Illinois, et al, 01

[David, Rick A. Matthews, Ohio University, William J. Miller, professor @ Carthage College, 2001, Critical Criminology, “Toward A Victimology of State Crime”, <http://jthomasniu.org/class/781/Assigs/kauzvictimology.pdf>, accessed 7-1-13, GSK]

Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from this review to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state crime victimization, although a caveat is in order because state crime takes a variety of forms. For instance, it is difﬁcult to compare the victimology of international economic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to institutionalized racism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects to unjust criminal justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propositions about the victims of state crime may be formulated based on current and prior research in the area.¶ (1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least Socially Powerful Actors¶ Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differences between the victim and victimizer. The authority of the state extends well beyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control others, and constitutional and due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.¶ State ofﬁcers, agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources to advance larger agendas through the use of specialized terminology, scientiﬁc knowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the human radiation experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomic and nuclear weapons tests, and the COINTELPRO, did not have the resources to marshal commensurate levels of technological, terminological, or scientiﬁc expertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and immoralities by privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and due processes. In the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and ideology, which allows unjust practices and policies to ﬂourish.¶ Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war, people targeted for genocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than state agencies and ofﬁcials. Scapegoating, stereotyping, proﬁling, and typifying people belonging to these groups is far easier for the state because of broad asymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing support for unethical and illegal practices and policies against these groups is not difﬁcult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisis or substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates against conceptualizing unjust state actions as crime. One can see evidence of this process at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and the support of terrorism abroad.¶ More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between the unequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, both domestically and internationally. Clearly, social power is unevenly distributed among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.¶ The United States has more control over the deﬁnition, enforcement, and prosecution of state crime than most countries. The World Court, the United Nations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are likely to support U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral and semi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization by the U.S. acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supported and enforced sanctions against Iraq and the death of innocent Iraqi children because of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resulted in social and physical harms.¶ Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international context help explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:¶ The claims-making and legitimation exercises of the authority (the U.S. state) are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a sizeable movement against U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either be unaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of radicals disconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfare rights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups). Social harms and higher immoralities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because of the apparent lack of overt conﬂict over the policy or practice. This makes it appear as though the harms are actually necessary, fair, and consensus-based.¶ U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point.¶ (2) Victimizers Generally Fail to Recognize and Understand the Nature, Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harm are Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Sense of “Entitlement”¶ The most important difference between victimizers and their victims is the power to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degree to which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness of their policies to bring about desired change, maintain hegemony, or promote other forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and international policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categorical imperatives (e.g. do no harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism, perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following Sykes and Matza¶ (1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problem of elite deviance. Denying responsibility, dehumanizing the powerless for purposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalist political economy and national security) are often employed in the victimology of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in the dehumanization.¶ Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makers neutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their policies is similar to the manner batterers view their victims. Noting the long history of U.S. abuses in¶ Latin and Central America, they argue that:¶ U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitled to control Central America and that the peoples of Central America are obligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that violence is permissible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that they are ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even if they involve violence; (3) that the use of violence, intimidation, and threat of violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negative one; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not unduly endanger the United States, and the country will neither sustain physical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that will outweigh the beneﬁts achieved through this violence (Tifft and Markham¶ 1991: 125–126).¶ Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct ofﬁ-cial responses to allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522) contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental ofﬁcials to such allegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothing happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something else); and implicatory denial (what happened is justiﬁed).” ¶ At the domestic level, few policy makers have recognized that the cumulative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and structural inequality have caused considerable harm to various minority groups and women. Often times, the victims are viewed as undeserving or unworthy of the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.¶ (3) Victims of State Crime are often Blamed for Their Suffering¶ Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most wounded by state crime. The poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targets of criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical intergenerational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structural odds. Prisoners and those accused of crimes are less likely to be treated sympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads to a marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects in the prisoner experiments were viewed as less deserving of informed consent at best and expendable at worst.¶ Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support of anti-democratic governments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) as a part of the United States’ interests in national security or the previously mentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher loyalties.” The harms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because, while they are easy to see, there is a tendency to assume victim responsibility on the part of citizens because they have not waged successful civil insurrections against their oppressors.¶ (4) Victims of State Crime Must Generally Rely on the Victimizer, an Associated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress¶ Theoretically, the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalization process in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people” are identiﬁed as the abstracted victim. What happens, however, when “the people” or a group of peoples are victimized by the body who holds dominion over them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available to the victim?¶ Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments, and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations may come about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interest groups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys. In other cases, appeal may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, through the United Nations General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic victimi-zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.¶ For example, the United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention for decades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were deﬁned as domestic affairs. Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginal standing in the international community as it pertains to human rights may therefore ﬁnd little in the way of assistance.¶ The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by a state, the use of nuclear weapons, has recently been criminalized through this latter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at least one organization of legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualized the entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaring the use and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law (see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however, international organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws or to punish nation-states that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N. General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but no ofﬁcial action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is little hope of formal intervention on the part of the international community when the offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S. opposition to international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sovereignty (no matter how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic and restorative justice.¶ In any case, the process of helping victims or even ending the victimization of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collar crime. This stems from problems related to the identiﬁcation of the actors, organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if the policy, actions, or omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful, criminal, or worthy of resistance.¶ (5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy Targets for Repeated Victimization¶ The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may change over time; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does not decrease – rather it merely takes another form. Additionally, some victims are continually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women, minorities, the poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries, in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g., domestic violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.¶ In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to alleviate the structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women have faced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in spite of superﬁcial efforts designed to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the targets of overt and institutionalized racism. While some have argued that afﬁrmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutionalized racism persists in spite of the progress which has been made. Native Americans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, and remain one of the most repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill¶ 1995).¶ Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjects and their families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agencies for decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium subjects, the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, which exhumed the bodies for additional research:¶ The purpose of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order to determine ...residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and that the subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (Advisory Committee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).¶ Two willful lies are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and (2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this: (a) the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injections, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium had been injected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland provides further evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his colleagues about the exhumation project:¶ Please note that outside the Center ... we will never use the word plutonium in regard to these cases. “These individuals are of interest to us because they may have received a radioactive material at some time is the kind of statement to be made, if we need to say anything at all” (Markey¶ Report 1986: 27).¶ (6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed by Individuals and Groups of Individuals, Are Manifestations of the Attempt to Achieve Organizational, Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals¶ A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to the actions of individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the larger goals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals may or may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Rather than viewing the harm to the victims of state crime as the result of a few people engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is more instructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pressures to achieve organizational goals. Many forms of state crime persist for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo against Cuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), and are carried out by many different actors. If the unethical, immoral, and/or illegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then one would presume that either the activities would desist once those people left the organization or that there would be other people waiting to ﬁll those roles.¶ Since many state crimes persist over time with different people ﬁlling various roles, one can only presume that either there are a lot of immoral people who come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethical behavior, or that there is something about the organizational culture itself which fosters such immorality. In the best case, the organization itself has a problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worst case, the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages such behavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and Lundman 1996).¶ Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore the social, political, and historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and goals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the various forms of state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linked to state crime victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts are exigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal and unethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmental degradation. Other times, the crimes may be politically and geographically contextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, may be instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for the persistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.

#### Sanctions take entire civilian populations hostage--The sacrifice of whole people for strategic interests is ethically indefensible

Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94

[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, <http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I>, accessed 7/8/13, VJ \*Paraphrased for Ableist language within brackets]

Comprehensive economic sanctions, then – continuing with the comparison above – have the ethical quality of terror bombings: the civilian population is explicitly taken hostage in the framework of a security strategy of power politics. It is self-evident that this kind of political instrumentalization of the human being – as the citizen of a community that is a subject in international law – is not compatible with his status as an autonomous subject, i.e. with human dignity.23 People have a natural right not to be sacrificed for a strategic purpose over whose formulation and realization they exercise no influence. As Quinn says, "They have a right not to be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior rights, into the service of other people's purposes."24 In the area of ethics, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" secures every person's right to veto "a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better place at his expense."25 It attacks the purely utilitarian approach (the maximization of usefulness) which, in the case of sanctions, could sacrifice the health and prosperity of a whole people for the sake of the external political purposes of member states in the Security Council or of another state coalition. (This could be clarified case by case in such measures as the sanctions placed against Iraq, Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, etc.) The sacrifice of a whole people for the sake of the strategic interests of a superpower or of a coalition of states (as may be formed within the Security Council) would appear to be in no way ethically justifiable.26 Assertions to this effect have already been made in connection with the sanctions against South Africa: if there are no general criteria for morally evaluating a particular political strategy, then those who have to bear the primary costs of measures such as sanctions should be able to decide whether they are to be imposed.27 The general ethical principle guiding the use of sanctions should thus be that consideration be taken of the affected population in the formulation of such measures. Precisely this principle, however, is excluded by the nature of the coercive measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As American authors have illustrated in an evaluation of the sanctions policy in the wake of the Gulf War, economic sanctions cause the civilian population to be held hostage in its own country.28 Measures such as those which explicitly intend to harm the population are to be judged as amoral,29 for "one cannot intentionally [weaken] cripple an economy without intentionally affecting the people whose working and consuming lives are partially constitutive of that economy."30

This is a form of American sponsored genocide on Cuban citizens

Simons, freelance author, 1999

[Geoff, “Imposing Economic Sanctions”, Pluto Press, 12-13, chip]

The years-long US attempt to deny Cuba access to food, medicine and drinkable water represents a clear case of genocide. The UN Genocide Convention 29 defines as genocide any of various acts intend to destroy ‘in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. These acts include: killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Genocide itself is punishable, as are the conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. Persons who may be punished include ‘constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’. The American blockade has had incalculable consequences for the health and general well-being of the Cuban people. With a de facto and de jure embargo on Cuban access to food and medicine, the incidence of disease and malnutrition has soared; with no sign of relief for a civilian population posing no conceivable strategic threat to the United States. As a few examples (apart from the broad trading prohibition): the US Treasury refused to license Medix (Argentina) to sell Cuba spare parts for medical equipment; the Ayerst Laboratories (Canada) has been blocked from supplying colyrum (for the treatment of gas and chemical damage to the eyes) to the Cuban health service; CGR Thompson (France) has been denied a US license to sell Cuba spare parts for medical X-ray equipment; Siemens (Germany) has been blocked from selling Gamma Cameras, an ultra-sound system and a Magnetic Nuclear Resonance system – all intended for use in the Cuban health service; Toshiba (Japan) has been denied licenses to sell medical equipment to Cuba; and Alfa-Laval (Sweden) has been blocked from supplying filtration cartridges to the Cuban health service.30Maria del Carmen, aged 27 (in July 1996), had been suffering seriously worsening sight for months and was unable to obtain glasses because of the blockade. Francisco Rodriquez, a journalist, commented: ‘Most people are affected by this blockade in terms of medicine, food, transport, water, electricity, all those basic needs. Living under this continual lack has made Cuban people very stressed, very nervous.’ Silvana Mayoral, a teacher, directed her anger at Washington: ‘They are crazy sometimes, the Americans. What gives them the right?’ A press release (30 November 1996) for the prestigious British medical journal the Lancet indicated the scale of the US embargo against the supply of medical supplies to Cuba. Dr Anthony F. Kirkpatrick (Tampa, Florida) was cataloguing firms (Johnson & Johnson, Merck, International Murex and others) that had been prevented from exporting medical equipment to Cuba. He has noted that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States has denounced the Cuban embargo on food and medicines as a violation of international law. In early 1997 journalists were continuing to report the affects of the US embargo on the civilian population: ‘The shortages of food and medicine meant that the kids became a bit more asthmatic and the adults got skinnier than ever ... Today, Fidel’s market reforms are gradually solving the food problem. But the kids are still sick.’31 In March 1997 the American Association for World Health – the US Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) – issued a report on the consequences of the embargo on Cuban health: ‘The outright ban on the sale of American foodstuffs has contributed to serious nutritional deficits, particularly among pregnant women, leading to an increase in low birth-weight babies ... food shortages were linked to a devastating outbreak of neuropathy numbering in the tens of thousands ... The embargo ... has led to serious cutbacks in supplies of safe drinking water ... a factor in the rising incidence of morbidity The US Role 139 and mortality rates ... Due to the direct or indirect effects of the embargo, the most routine medical supplies are in short supply or entirely absent from some Cuban clinics.’32 Media coverage of the report in the West was minimal. The Guardian(7 March 1997), under the heading ‘Children die in agony as US trade ban stifles Cuba’, gave various details: Child cancer sufferers are some of the most distressing victims of the embargo, which bans Cuba from buying nearly half of the world-class drugs in a market dominated by US manufacturers. This team visited a paediatric ward which had been without the nausea preventing drug, metclopramide HCl, for 22 days. It found that 22 children undergoing chemotherapy were vomiting on average 28 to 30 times a day. Another girl, aged five, in a cancer ward lacking Implantofix for chemotherapy, was being treated through her jugular vein because all her other veins had collapsed. She was in excruciating pain. The American Association for World Health (AAWH) noted that few other embargoes had banned food and denied life-saving medicines to ordinary citizens: ‘Such an embargo appears to violate the most basic international charters and conventions governing human rights, including the United Nations charter, the charter of the Organization of American States, and the Articles of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of civilians in wartime.

Sanctions are economic bullying—only the superpowers have the ability to hurt growing nations to make the rich richer and the poor poorer

Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99

[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 136-137 ,Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Large and diversified economies are virtually immune to sanctions, since they have the economic flexibility to pay higher costs in the short run, and to make structural changes in the long run.sq Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott note that nations with weak or unstable economies therefore make the best targets for economic sanctions. In a section entitled “The Weakest Go to the Wall,” they argue that “there seems to be a direct correlation between the political and economic health of the target country and its susceptibility to economic pressure,” and suggest that their data “demonstrate that countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to succumb to coercion by the sender country. “3s They conclude with a list of “dos and don’ts” for those imposing sanctions, including “Do pick on the weak and helpless. “3s Their analysis of the cases indicates that sanctions are most effective when the target is much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and economically weak and politically unstable. In successful cases, the average sender’s economy was 187 times larger than that of the average target.37 Thus, sanctions offer themselves solely as mechanisms that strong nations with large economies, or international alliances including strong nations with large economies, can effectively use against countries with weak or import-dependent economies, or countries with unstable governments. The reverse is not true— sanctions are not a device realistically available to small or poor nations that can be used with any significant impact against large or economically dominant nations, even if the latter were to, say, engage in aggression or human rights violations, or otherwise offend the international community. This has been obvious since the reformulation of sanctions as a tool of international law.38 Therefore, there is a danger that sanctions will be used “opportunistically” by powerful nations39 —for example, as a response by a superpower to its declining economic hegemony. Here we can understand the particular enthusiasm the United States holds for sanctions; the sheer size of the U.S. economy means that sanctions can be imposed at little cost to itself, and with no likelihood that any other nation could retaliate in kind. It would seem that we have lost altogether the rationale for sanctions that was articulated in the formation of the League of Nations, It may be that sanctions, and the attendant harm to innocents, can be justified as an alternative to actual warfare; but in order to justify this choice on utilitarian grounds, we would have to have reason to believe that sanctions in fact obtain compliance by the target state. If not, then they simply constitute the gratuitous imposition of suffering on a helpless population, for no ethically defensible reason.

We control the scale of violence – structural violence is necessary to psychologically prime people for macro-level conflict

Scheper-Hughes, Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely, and Bourgois Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn, ‘4

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

Utilitarianism is a faulty lens for sanctions—an ethical standpoint is necessary

Kochler, Professor of Philosophy, 94

[Dr. Hans, International Press Organization, “Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and Human Rights”, <http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm#I>, accessed 7/8/13, VJ]

Comprehensive economic sanctions which heavily impact the life and health of the civilian population need to be analyzed from an ethical standpoint before a normative evaluation of the current practice in international law can be undertaken. Indeed, comprehensive economic sanctions seem to be the "classical" instruments for inducing submission in the power politics of the so-called "New World Order"14 – and instruments whose permissibility must be critically examined from the standpoint of ethics as well as of international law. It does not of necessity follow that a measure praised as the panacea of power politics fulfills the requirements placed on a legitimate international order. In the first place, coercive measures like economic sanctions represent a form of collective punishment15 and thus do not comply with the ethical principle of individual responsibility, i. e. with the ability to attribute behaviour to an individual. The punishment of people not responsible for political decisions is most akin to a terrorist measure; the aim of such a measure is to influence the government's course of action by deliberately assaulting the civilian population.16 Purposefully injuring the innocent is, however, an immoral act per se, one which cannot be justified by any construction of utilitarian ethics. In accordance with the conception of Thomas Aquinas, inquiring into the intention behind a particular decision is of decisive value for an ethical evaluation.17 In the present context, several conditions govern the moral permissibility of acts in which a morally questionable bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must be morally acceptable; (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense, intended); and (d) the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot18, (that is, must be important enough to justify the bad upshot).19 The problematic nature of this utilitarian context of evaluation is plain to view. Are those who suffer under a certain measure to be viewed sympathetically as the victims of the pursuit of a good intention, or is their suffering to be regarded as the deliberate component of a strategy? This debate seems merely to invite hypocritical casuistry. The outcome for the affected population is one and the same. A "superficial" difference may only be discerned by an ethics of attitude from the viewpoint of the perpetrator. The latter appeases his conscience with reference to the unintentional but "inevitable" side effects. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the so-called "Doctrine of Double Effect" was developed, following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas.20 It was designed to help clarify ethical questions that arise when a morally good end can only be reached through inflicting harm upon other people.21 In the concrete instance of comprehensive economic sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the moral good that is aspired is the maintenance or restoration of international peace; the wrong that is thereby effected is the suffering of the civilian population (including sickness and death as results of the mass suffering that accompanies the breakdown in the distribution of essential commodities). According to Quinn's ethical analysis, it is necessary to take into account the relation which the aspired goal has to the foreseen wrong that results from it.22 In this context, Quinn refers to the difference between "terror bombing" and "strategic" bombing in war: in the first instance, the suffering of the civilian population is deliberately intended; in the second, the possibility that the population will suffer is merely tolerated. In the first instance, harm is directly inflicted, in the second case indirectly. (In accordance with the currently valid rules of international humanitarian law, which we will later examine more closely, terror bombings are strictly prohibited, for the civilian population is never allowed to be the direct target in a military conflict.) Economic sanctions, however, are in line with the first case mentioned above: harm is directly and deliberately inflicted so as to force the government to alter its course of action.

Backlash of other parties shouldn’t implicate your decision calculus as an ethical policy maker

Alan Gewirth, Professor of Philosophy @ The University of Chicago, 1982

(“Human Rights: Essay on Justification and Application.” Pg. 230)

The required supplement is provided by the principle of intervening action. According to this principle, when there is a casual connection between some person A’s performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person C’s incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z through recklessness. The reason for this removal is that B’s intervening action Y is more direct of proximate cause of Z and, unlike A’s action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of intervening action, however, it was King’s opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks.

Placing blame on the Cuban regime is a psychological defense mechanism used to evade responsibility for an ongoing genocide.

Simons, former chief editor at the National Computing Centre, 97 (Geoff Leslie, The Scourging of Iraq : Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, p. 210)

Any attempt to confront someone (official or other) with the fact of a prevailing genocide in which they may be implicated, albeit indirectly, immediately generates¶ various defensive reactions. Ideology and propaganda have already prepared the ground. An initial response may be silence, while the water is tested. Why am I being¶ challenged in such a way? Then the exculpations are presented. In the case of Iraq¶ the demonisation of Saddam Hussein has accomplished everything. If the Iraqi people are suffering, it is Saddam's fault. If Iraqi infants are going blind through want of¶ insulin, he should have thought of that. If Iraqi women are being forced to endure caesarian sections without anaesthetic, what a monster Saddam Hussein must be.¶ Guilt transference — if I, my country, our allies, my ideology are full of rectitude, then who can be blamed for the manifest fact that Iraqi babies lie dying in their¶ thousands in dirty hospital wards? The propaganda has done its filthy work. If I or my government are withholding medicine and food from sick and malnourished¶ children then there must be a very good reason. What can it be? It is obviously the fault of the demon.¶ Attempts have been made to identify the psychological elements that combine to shape the mentalities of those involved in genocide. Thus Robert Jay Lifton, a¶ professor of psychiatry and psychology at the City University of New York, and Eric Markusen, an associate professor of sociology at Carthage College (Kenosha,¶ Wisconsin), have highlighted the 'psychological mechanisms that protect individual people from inwardly experiencing the harmful effects, immediate or potential, of¶ their own actions on others'. 50 Such devices, 'all of which blunt feelings', include such elements as 'dissociation or splitting' (where a part of the mind separates from¶ the whole), 'psychic numbing' (a reduced capacity or inclination to feel), 'brutalization' (allowing sustained behaviour that causes harm to others), and¶ 'doubling' (akin to splitting, but where a second self emerges to allow the person some sanctuary from otherwise unsettling experiences).¶ All such mechanisms, along with guilt transference, are evident in public and private people that today support the continuation of the antiIraq¶ sanctions regime. It must¶ be right or we would not be doing it. If the Iraqis are dying and diseased, it isn't my fault, my government's fault, President Clinton's fault, the UN's fault. It's all¶ Saddam's fault. If he won't say what happened to some biological material eight years ago then of course we should starve another one million Iraqis to death. In any¶ case, I've enough to think about, you're too argumentative, and politicians are all the same. I don't really care, I've enough to think about. Yes, it's all very sad, but¶ that's how things are.

Sole focus on survival destroys value to life and is always used to justify the worst atrocities.

Callahan, Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics, 1973

(Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, Pages 91-93)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and beating children. Some have suggested we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life and thus procreate more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life - then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be make to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

Utilitarianism destroys human value – it treats people as means to an end

Grisez, professor of Christian ethics @ Mount Saint Mary’s College and Shaw, 94

(Germain Gabriel and Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom p 28)

One arrives at a different judgment of how one ought to proceed in such circumstances if human life is regarded, not as one of the things of relative value which a person has, but as an intrinsic component of the person, and so as a value which shares in the dignity of the person. In denying that we can choose to kill one person for the sake of two, we really are denying that two persons are "worth" twice as much as some other real person. On this view it is simply not possible to make the sort of calculation which weighs persons against each other (my life is more valuable than John's life, John's life is more valuable than Mary's and Tom's combined, or vice versa) and thus to determine whose life shall be respected and whose sacrificed. The value of each human person is incalculable, not in any merely poetic sense, but simply because it is not susceptible to calculation, measurement, weighing, and balancing. Traditionally this point has been expressed by the statement that the end does not justify the means. This is a way of saying that the direct violation of any good intrinsic to the person cannot be justified by the good result which such a violation may bring about. What is extrinsic to human persons may be used for the good of persons, but what is intrinsic to persons has a kind of sacredness and may not be violated.

Smart sanctions only mask civilian suffering—sanctions are inherently unethical

Gordon, professor at Fairfield University, 99

[Joy, March, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions”, page 141-142, Wiley Library, accessed 7/7/13, VJ]

Many of those who defend sanctions do not argue that damage to innocents is morally acceptable, but rather that this damage is not inherent in sanctions and could in principle be mitigated or avoided altogether. Where measures are taken to minimize civilian harm, the argument goes, sanctions are ethically defensible. But this optimism is inconsistent with the nature of economic sanctions, as well as with the history of sanctions and the logic of the vested interests created by sanctions. If economic sanctions are motivated by an intent to do economic damage, then partial sanctions and humanitarian exemptions will allow the target nation to adjust its economy to minimize the overall damage, undermining the intentions of the political actors imposing the sanctions. The more complete the sanctions, the more effective they will be, in terms of economic damage; but that in turn means that the economy as a whole will be undermined. The greater the degree to which the economy is generally undermined, the greater the damage to the civilian population, outside the military and political leadership. The greater the damage to the civilian population, the more serious the harm will be to the most vulnerable sectors—infants, the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, pregnant women, widows with children. Sanctions that are economically effective necessarily entail the greatest harm to those who are the most vulnerable and the most disenfranchised from power. The ethical dilemma is not resolved by placing blame on the target state for its initial wrongdoing or for its response to economic crisis. We know from the history of sanctions, and of sieges and blockades in wartime, that the state will generally increase the proportion of the economy that goes to the support of the political leadership and to the military, for any of a number of reasons: because national security is legitimately seen as the highest priority, or because the nature of the “siege mentality” is that the leadership will first protect itself, or because desperate need for basic goods creates opportunities for black marketeering. This may shift part of the moral responsibility to the target state, but it does not vitiate the moral agency that resides in the state that initiated the crisis by imposing sanctions in the first place, particularly in light of the predictability of the outcome. The use of sanctions is even more troubling if we acknowledge that the odds are not good that any political ends will be achieved by sanctions. Even if the end is one that could justify the human cost of sanctions—such as stopping military aggression— the one thing we know about sanctions is that they are generally unlikely to achieve their goal. Alternatively, we could frame the “goals” of sanctions not in terms of political ends, but in terms of punishment or symbolic expression. However, these cannot claim the ethical justification that was invoked when sanctions were seen as the means of stopping war—that harm to innocents may be justified when it is for the purpose of preventing a far greater harm. Establishing criteria for the ethical use of sanctions does not resolve these contradictions, but instead masks them. To say that sanctions are ethical as long as we make sure to minimize civilian harm is to mask the fact that sanctions by their nature cause harm to civilians directly and primarily. It is like using a pickaxe for brain surgery the nature of the instrument suggests that targeting certain areas with precision and effectiveness, without killing the patient in the process, is not going to happen. It is disingenuous to be surprised or apologetic when sanctions turn out to do no harm to a ruling elite, to achieve none of the ostensible goals of the sanctions regarding “unacceptable behavior” or “punishment of international outlaws, ” and to be generally ineffectual for much of anything besides rhetorical posturing and the psychological gratification of having done something.

**Purely conjoining together link and internal link claims only makes predictions less likely and misdirects resources---policy analysis suffers from conjunctive fallacy that relies on a flawed methodology**

**Berube, 2k.** (David M Berube, PhD, and Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the Univ of South Carolina. “Debunking Mini-Max Reasoning: The Limits of Extended Causal Chains in Contest Debating” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate. 21(2000). Online PDF.)

What was a knotty piece of evidence in the 1980s kick-started a practice in contest debating which currently is evident in the ubiquitous political capital disadvantage code-named "Clinton." Here is an example of the Clinton disadvantage. In theory, plan action causes some tradeoff (real or imaginary) that either increases or decreases the President's ability to execute a particular agenda. Debaters have argued the following: Clinton (soon to be Gore or Bush) needs to focus on foreign affairs. A recent agreement between Barak and Assad needs presidential stewardship. The affirmative plan shifts presidential focus to Nigeria that trades off with focus on the Middle East. As a result, the deal for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria fails. Violence and conflict ensues as Hizbollah terrorists launch Guerilla attacks into northern Israel from Lebanon. Israel strikes back. Hizbollah incursions increase. Chemical terrorism ensues and Israel attacks Hizbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon with tactical nuclear weapons. Iran launches chemical weapons against Tel Aviv. Iraq allies with Iran. The United States is drawn in. Superpower miscalculation results in all-out nuclear war culminating in a nuclear winter and the end of all life on the planet. This low-probability high-consequence event argument is an extended argument using mini-max reasoning. The appeal of mini-max risk arguments has heightened with the onset of on-line text retrieval services and the World Wide Web, both of which allow debaters to search for particular words or word strings with relative ease. Extended arguments are fabricated by linking evidence in which a word or word string serves as the common denominator, much in the fashion of the sorities (stacked syllogism): AaB, BaC, CaD, therefore AaD. Prior to computerized search engines, a contest debater's search for segments that could be woven together into an extended argument was incredibly time consuming. The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims by debunking especially fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. The World Wide Web allows virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity. Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy Search® help contest debaters track down particular words and phrases. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® locate words and word strings within n words of each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite impact, such as the ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war. Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval services is unqualified or under-qualified. Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. In nearly every episode of fear mongering . . . people with fancy titles appeared. . . For some species of scares . . . secondary scholars are standard fixtures. . . . Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the fear mongers' trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous. . . . (Glassner 206, 208) Hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates probability estimates in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. Often the link and internal link story is the machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage. The links in the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a result, contextual considerations can be mostly moot. Not only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature Boolean logic uses terms only to show their relationships – of inclusion and exclusion – among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers…. The Boolean search shows the characteristic way that we put questions to the world of information. When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast knowledge. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels…But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind . . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. The pathways of thought, not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a Boolean arrangement of freeways." (Helm 18, 22-25) Heim worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty drawers of information, stifling imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas for good reasons. The problems worsen when researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these computerized research services, debaters are easily able to build extended mini-max arguments ending in Armageddon. Outsiders to contest debating have remarked simply that too many policy debate arguments end in all-out nuclear war: consequently, they categorize the activity as foolish. How many times have educators had contest debaters in a classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of their classmates? They cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles Richet's adage: "The stupid man is not the one who does not understand something - but the man who understands it well enough yet acts as if he didn't" (Tabori 6). Regrettably, mini-max arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating. "Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment" (Nehnevajsa 521). Regardless of their persuasiveness, Bashor and others have discovered that mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues. For example, in his assessment of low probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation. As such, they need to be debunked. Experts agree. For example, Slovic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis since it drives much of our public policy. "Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power" (699). When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens. This essay intends to examine some of the problems associated with extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. First, extended arguments will be examined in respect to logical problems associated with causality, corroboration, and equivocation. Second, mini-max reasoning will be examined in an attempt to debunk its persuasiveness. Finally, I will introduce three criteria for assessing the probative value of mini-max extended arguments. The Limits of Extended Arguments The Strength of the relationship between the claims in extended arguments rests on the probability of the causation between and among the simple claims. The relationship between each claim in an extended argument is moderated by its probability. Probability is challenging to define. Many scientists and members of the risk assessment community “have not as yet come to grips with the foundational issue about the meaning of probability and the various interpretations that can be attached to the term probability. This is extremely important, for it is how one views probability that determines one attitude toward a statistical procedure” (Singpurwalla 182). We employ the notion of probability when we do not know a thing with certainty. But our certainty is either purely subjective (we do not know what will take place, but someone else may know) or objective (no one knows, and no one can know). Subjective probability is a compass for an informational disability… Probability is, so to speak, a cane for a blind man; he uses it to feel his way. If he could see, he would not need the cane, and if I knew which horse was the fastest, I would not need probability theory. (Lem 142) In simple arguments, “risks are simply the product of probability and consequence” (Thompson and Parkinson 552). Thompson and Parkinson found a difficulty in risk assessment associated with mini-max arguments that they identified as the problem of risk tails. “Risk tails are the segments of the standard risk curve which approach the probability and consequences axes. The tails represent high-consequence low-probability risk and low-consequence high-probability risk” 552). This region, especially the high-consequences low-probability tail, is the site of mini-max computation. The complex probabilities of extended arguments are problematic. For example, too much reliance is given an extended link story when each step in the link exhibits a probability that is geometrically self-effacing. According to the traditional multiplication theorem, if a story is drawn from AaBaCaD, the probabilities of AaB and BaC and CaD are multiplied. “The probability that two subsequent events will both happen is a ratio compounded of the probability of the 1st, and the probability of the 2nd in the supposition the 1st happens” (Bayes 299). If the probability of AaB is .10 and the probability of BaC is also .10, then the probability of AaC is .01. If the probability of CaD is also .10, then the probability of AaD is .001. If all we had to do to determine probability involved multiplying fractions, calculating probabilities would be easy. Unfortunately, such is not the case. An interesting caveat involves conditional probability. “Its expositors hold that we should not concern ourselves with absolute probabilities, which have no relevance to things as they are, but with conditional probabilities – the chances that some event will occur when some set of previous conditions exists” (Krause 67). Conditional probabilities are most often associated with calculations involving variables that may be even remotely associated, such as phenomena in international relations. If one considers the probability of many separate events occurring, one must also consider whether or not they are correlated – that is, whether or not they are truly independent. If they are correlated, simply multiplying individual probabilities will not give you the correct estimate, and the final probability may actually be much larger than one will predict if one makes this error. For example, the probability that I will utter an obscenity at any given instance may be small (although it is certainly not zero). The probability that I will hit my funny bone and then utter an obscenity is not equal to the product of the probabilities, since the probability of swearing at a given instant is correlated to the probability of hurting myself at a given instant. (Krause 67) Hence, “if we calculate a priori the probability of the occurred event and the probability of an event composed of that and a second one which is expected, the second probability divided by the first will be the probability of the event expected, drawn from the observed event” (Laplace 15). Another complication of extended causal chains is the corroboration principle. “There are cases in which each testimony seems unreliable (i.e., has less than 0.5 probability) on its own, even though the combination of the two testimonies is rather persuasive…If both testimonies are genuinely independent and fully agree with one another, we are surely going to be inclined to accept them” (Cohen 72). When we are uncertain about a probability, we might try to engage multiple sources making the same or same-like claim. We feel it is less likely that two or more sources are incorrect than that a single source will be. While corroboration seems valid, it is persuasive pipe-dream. If we use this calculus to draw our claims, errors are likely to be shared and replicated. Witness some of the problems associated with realism in international relations literature. As such, the multiplication theorem has been subverted by conditional probabilities and undercut by corroboration, but contest debaters and policy makers have not risen to the challenge. While contest debating has borrowed heavily from policymaking systems analysis, it has not resolved the causality issues any better than have policy studies experts. The grand calculus used in systems analysis is as simplistic as it is in contest debating. Lichtman and Rohrer described what happens to systems analysis in a contest debate two decades ago. “To determine the level of net benefits achieved by a policy system when multiple outcomes are considered, policy makers simply sum, for all anticipated results, the product of their probabilities and values” (238). In contest debating, each critic will have her own threshold at which she is prepared to make a commitment. The critic tries to establish this threshold by examining the probabilities of the causal story in the argument. Zarefsky asserted that setting the threshold may be so challenging that most critics opt for rounding instead. The only alternative to probabilistic analysis in argumentation is a rounding-off process that either reduces probability measures to zeros or elevates them to one (100)… Yet whatever the threshold chosen by a decision maker may be, the practical result is still a rounding-off of probability to zero or one with consequent errors, in the assessment of policy. (Qtd in Lichtman and Rohrer 239) Zarefsky’s observation is intriguing. Consider how often critics have voided disadvantages following a uniqueness a response. For example, in response to a Presidential leadership internal link story, a contest debater may claim that recent Presidential behavior makes the claim not unique. However, uniqueness is not a threshold issue, it is a linear one, a probabilistic one. While the response reduces the likelihood of the internal link story, uniqueness responses only reduce the probability of the internal link story. The likeliness a uniqueness response is absolute is very low. Some uniqueness, or probability, remains after a uniqueness challenge, yet the critics round down and ignore the leadership disadvantage entirely. On the other hand, many judges round up as well, responding to contest debaters who have begged the risk question by a final rebuttal appeal to mini-max reasoning. Risk theorists find this false dualism troubling. For example, de Sousa warns: A pragmatic conception of probability needs something broader than mere acceptance, for acceptance is an on/off matter, and probability has degrees… Because of this lottery paradox, high probabilities can never be a sufficient condition of acceptance. And because of what I call the Lem Paradox, low probability can never be a sufficient condition of rejection.” (261) Tooley posed an even more intriguing question: “Does our world, then, simply contain an enormous number of highly unlikely accidents?” (105). The proponent of a mini-max disadvantage would want you to believe that such is true. Recently, we have learned highly unlikely accidents in a chaotic system are ordered (Butz). If so, the extended mini-max argument might be one such ordering. Unfortunately for proponents of extended mini-max arguments, once any system is dominated by highly unlikely accidents, the logic of the extended argument corrodes. Predicting unpredictability is paradoxical. We expect the critic in a contest debate to assess the strength of an extended argument and resolve its disposition. However, when the consequences is nearly infinite, it makes such a probability calculation thorny. Debaters seldom provide critics with a discussion of multiplicational versus correlational probability assessments, and often substitute simple corroboration for probability assessments. While any claim made about a debate resolution by examining the plan might be deductive or inductive, the conception of an extended argument is more akin to what C.S. Peirce called abduction. “Abduction merely suggests that something might be” (qtd. in Lanigan 50). As Schweder wrote, “Transcendent realities are of our own making, which sometimes succeed in binding us to the underlying reality that we imagine by giving us an intellectual tool – a metaphor, a premise, an analogy, a category – with which to live, to arrange our experience, and to interpret our experiences so arranged. In other words, the abductive faculty is the faculty of imagination” (361). In the typical mini-max extended argument, a contest debater identifies a principle rule, i.e., Presidential focus is limited and forces tradeoffs, then examines a result, i.e., the plan and its implications within a specific spatio-temporal political setting, and finally interpolates a case, i.e., the scenario and impact story. Such speculation is purely imaginative, especially when a debater uses multiple sources to create the argument. Peirce proposes three rules for valid abduction: The hypothesis must explain the facts at hand. It must be capable of being subjected to experimental confirmation. It must be guided by economic considerations (Fann 59). What happens in contest debating? The contest debater hardly randomizes observations drawn from research. While a research plan of any sort makes this unlikely, the Boolean search engines used for online text retrieval services, for example, make it wholly unlikely. That a contest debater might introduce exceptions within the extended mini-max argument is pure fancy. As such, even the extended mini-max argument is abduction is fallacious. As Peirce admitted, “From deduction to induction to abduction the security decreases greatly, while the uberty increases greatly” (qtd. in Fann 8). Unsurprisingly, the extended argument tends to have low validity and reliability whether deduced, induced, or abduced. A final drawback of the extended argument is the likelihood of equivocation, particularly the term shift fallacy. Cedarbloom describes the problem. If an expression is used more than once in an argument, it must have the same meaning throughout the argument. When a word or expression shifts meaning from one occurrence in the argument to the next, the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. Why do you doubt the miracles described in the Bible when you’ve witnessed miracles like man (sic) landing on the moon? In the first occurrence, miracle means something that defies the laws of nature. In the second occurrence, miracle means something amazing, that you wouldn’t have thought could be done. The fact that the second kind of miracle occurred doesn’t make it more likely that the first kind occurred. (108) The potential for term shifts in extended arguments is derived from the common practice of using terms distributed across several sources as a way of linking those sources in such a manner that they seem to construct a cohesive line of argument. The stringing together of out-of-context statements from multiple sources, each unaware of the new context into which their statements have been positioned, literally begs the question of equivocation.